Effects of foreign presence and affiliate control on the productivity of domestic companies in a transition economy: the case of Polish manufacturing 1993-2002. by Pawlik, Konrad
 
WORKING PAPER 2005-11 
Konrad Pawlik 
Effects of foreign presence and affiliate control 
on the productivity of domestic companies in a 
transition economy: the case of Polish manufac-
turing 1993-2002 
International Business Section Effects of foreign presence and affiliate control on the 
productivity of domestic companies in a transition economy: the 
case of Polish manufacturing 1993-2002 
 
 
Konrad Pawlik  
Department of Management and International Business 
 Aarhus School of Business 
 Haslegaardsvej 10-12 
Aarhus, Denmark 
Phone: +45 8948 6862 







The aim of this paper is to study the significance of Foreign Direct Investments and their spillover 
effects in a transition country such as that of Poland. A unique cross-industry dataset on foreign 
companies, domestic private and domestic public companies has been analysed. Four different 
measures (foreign equity, sales, investments and labour) of foreign presence as a share of the whole 
industry have been used. The results show that the level of productivity of domestic private companies 
has increased steadily since 1994. A high share of foreign sales and foreign equity in the industry has 
a negative impact on the productivity of private companies, thus implying a “crowding out” effect. No 
evidence has been found for association between productivity in domestic companies and foreign 
control over MNE affiliates which may indicate tacit knowledge spillovers. Control variables such as 
one year lagged labour compensation and scale in domestic private and public companies are 
positively associated with their productivities.  
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1. Introduction 
In 2002, R&D expenditures in Poland were at the lowest level in Polish history and accounted 
for 0.34% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while the EU average was 2.5% (GUS, 
2004). Similar trends were observed in the other transition countries. Multinational Enterprises are the 
world’s largest technology producers (Eden et al., 1997). They account for 75-80% of all private R&D 
expenditures worldwide (Dunning, 1993), and knowledge transferred within MNE boundaries (from 
parent to the affiliates) might leak to the host country. As a result, academics and policymakers in 
many transition economies give high priority to attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), 
expecting FDI inflows to bring capital, new technologies, marketing techniques, and management 
skills. While all potential benefits of FDIs are perceived as important, particular emphasis is placed on 
the contribution of FDIs to increasing the productivity and competitiveness of domestic companies. 
FDIs may have positive effects on local firms, which may gain knowledge about new technologies and 
organizational practises, or negative effects, as is the case when local firms are unable to survive the 
increase in competition offered by the MNE.  
The existing literature on spillover effects is vast, analysing spillovers at different levels (intra-
industry level and across industries), using complementary measures (profits, productivity), focusing 
on the economy as a whole or on specific industries, sourcing its statistical figures from industry or 
firm level data, and focusing on developed, developing or transition economies (and on groups or 
individual countries).  
After 13 years of systemic transformation, a total of USD65bn of foreign capital has flowed into 
Poland (PAIZ, 2003), resulting in an increase in foreign presence in several industries (Pawlik, 2005). 
Although the time span has been short, the scope is already large but, surprisingly, FDI inflow into 
Poland has not produced significant research on spillover effects on the local economy. Although 
transition economies have been relatively intensively investigated with regard to spillovers, there are 
only three well-known studies on spillovers to local companies in Poland, and these found negative 
spillovers (Zukowska-Gagelmann, 2000) or no evidence of spillover effects (Konings, 2001; Demijan 
et al., 2000).   
The aim of this paper is to establish whether spillovers vary with regard to strategic activities   3
and investment characteristics. The paper provides evidence on the nature and effects of spillovers to 
domestic companies, both private and public. Four complementary measures are used to estimate the 
externalities of the foreign presence on domestic companies: equity, sales and investment ratios are 
used as proxies for vertical/forward linkages while labour turnover (spilling technological and 
managerial knowledge) is measured by foreign presence with regard to labour. In accordance with the 
evolutionary theory of the firm (Kogut and Zander, 1993), the paper also analyses the impact on 
domestic companies of increasing foreign control of foreign affiliates. The reason for adding aspects 
of foreign control is that this allows us to check whether socalled tacit knowledge leaks to domestic 
companies. In addition, the model is controlled for recipient firm size, investment intensity and labour 
compensation. In order to eliminate possible endogeneity between foreign presence and domestic 
productivity, an instrumented variables fixed effect panel estimation model will be applied. The model 
is analysed using a unique cross-industry and cross-ownership database on Polish manufacturing 
covering the years 1993-2002.  
The paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a theoretical overview leading to 
the formulation of a number of hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the dataset, the measures of foreign 
presence used and the estimation techniques. Section 4 presents the results and assesses the hypotheses 
in the light of these, while section 5 concludes and gives some policy implications.   4
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Overview of studies on spillovers 
Research on the impact of MNE activities on the productivity of domestic companies has a long 
history originating in the 1970s. The results have been mixed, finding that foreign presence has 
positive, negative or even no spillover effects on local companies. The analyses of spillovers have 
mainly been at industry or firm level. Early studies focused primarily at the industry level, finding 
positive spillover effects from increasing foreign presence (Caves, 1974; Globerman, 1979; 
Blomstorm and Persson, 1983; Rhee and Belot, 1989). In his study on European countries, however, 
Cantwell (1989) found negative spillovers in most industry sectors but positive effects in low 
technology industries. These results were, to some extent, confirmed by Kokko (1994), who showed 
that positive spillovers are less likely in industries with highly differentiated products and large 
economies of scale. Later studies of firm level data reached fairly mixed results but they were more 
profound than the earlier ones, testing differences between firms, competition effects, value chain 
linkages, labour turnover, etc. (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Kokko, Tasini and Zejan, 1996; Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999).  
Table 1. Spillover effects on domestic productivity. 
Author  Year  Country  Spillover effects  
Caves 1974  Australia  positive 
Globerman 1979  Canada  positive 
Blomstrom and Persson   1983  Mexico  positive 
Cantwell  1989  several European countries 
negative  
(positive spillovers in low-tech sectors) 
Rhee and Belot  1989  Mauritius and Bangladesh  positive 
Nadiri 1991  OECD  countries  weak positive  
Haddad and Harrison  1993  Morocco 
no significant effect 
 (positive spillovers in low-tech sectors) 
Blomstrom and Wolff   1994  Mexico  positive 
Kokko 1994 Mexico 
positive  
(positive spillovers are less likely in industries with highly 
differentiated products and large economies of scale) 
Kokko, Tansini and Zejan  1996  Urugway 
positive  
(only in industries with a small technology gap) 
Aitken and Harrison  1999  Venezuela  negative 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm  1999  Indonesia 
positive  
(joint ventures have different effects than wholly-owned 
foreign affiliates on domestic productivity 
Liu, Siler, Wang and Wei   2000  UK  positive 
Li 2001  China  positive 
Sadik, Bolbol  2001  Arab countries  positive 
Liu 2002  China  positive 
Source: Own adaptation.   5
In transition economies, the issue of technology transfer and potential spillover effects are of particular 
concern since these countries aim at creating a well-functioning market economy on the basis of 
technological upgrading through the acquisition of new production and organization capabilities by 
local companies (Meyer and Sinani, 2003). From this perspective, FDIs are a vital source for 
economic transition, which requires the restructuring of enterprises (Jones et al., 1998, Estrin and 
Rosevear 1998, Buck et al., 1998). Foreign companies have direct influence on transition countries in 
that they acquire collapsing companies or indirectly interact with domestic firms which have come in 
contact with foreign owned entities. Since the mid-1990s – merely a few years after the opening of the 
economies in Central and Eastern Europe, which until then had been centrally planned, these 
economies have become the subject of numerous empirical studies, possibly making spillover effects 
in this region the relatively most intensely studied in the world. The results, however, varied; in 
general, they failed to find any positive spillovers and, in several cases, they found that negative ones 
prevailed (Table 2).  
Table 2. Spillover effects on domestic companies; studies of transition economies. 
Country Author   
Years 
analysed Spillover effects  
Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers  Bulgaria 
Konings 1993-1997  negative spillovers 
Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers  Czech Republic 
Djankov and Hoekman   1993-1997  negative spillovers 
Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers 
Estonia 
Meyer and Sinani  1998-2000  Mixed results for different types of ownership in local companies 
Bosco   2001  negative spillovers  Hungary 
Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers 
Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers 
Konings 1993-1997  no evidence of spillovers  Poland 
Zukowska-Gagelmann 1993-1997  negative spillovers 
Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers  Romania 
Konings 1993-1997  negative spillovers 
Slovakia  Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers 
Slovenia  Damijan et al.  1994-1998  no evidence of spillovers 
Russia  Yudaeva et al.  2000  positive spillovers 
Source: Own adaptation 
These investigations were mostly firm-level based and conducted in the initial stage of economic 
transition (1993-1998), when FDI inflow was still at a low level. The only study to have found 
positive spillovers in a transition economy is a recent one by Meyer and Sinani (2001) on Estonia. 
Their paper shows positive spillovers for state-owned and outsider-owned firms whereas insider-  6
owned firms have experienced strong negative spillovers. The findings of all the investigations of 
spillovers in transition economies led to the strong dictum by Rodrik (1999) that, “Today’s policy 
literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers from FDI but the evidence is 
sobering”.  
All types of studies on spillovers have identified four different channels of spillovers from 
foreign companies to domestic firms. These are: demonstration effects, backward and forward 
linkages, labour turnover and competition.  
The demonstration effect occurs as growing geographical and operational proximity increases 
information flows among firms and facilitates learning by the competitor (Eden et al., 1996). Before a 
technology is widely known, lack of information about its benefits and costs implies uncertainty and 
may discourage existing firms from adopting the technology. Technology spreads most easily when 
the producer and potential user are already in contact and linkages already exist. This suggests that 
knowledge diffusion is faster the closer the proximity and the larger the share of the MNE technology 
in the local base. 
Demonstration effects do not involve the replication of technology and it would be surprising if 
the rents accruing to the MNE were entirely dissipated by the process (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). 
Any improvements in local technology, however, which derive from demonstration effects result in 
spillovers benefit the productivity of local firms. 
Backward and forward linkages (vertical linkages) are the result of technical assistance and 
support to suppliers and customers provided by the MNEs, which improves productivity in local firms. 
Such spillovers can operate through, “direct knowledge transfer from foreign customers to local 
suppliers; higher requirements regarding product quality, which provide incentive to domestic 
suppliers to upgrade their production technology; increased demand for intermediate products due to 
multinational entry, which allows local suppliers to reap the benefits of scale economies; competition 
effect−multinationals acquiring domestic firms may choose to source intermediates abroad thus 
breaking existing supplier-customer relationships and increasing competition in the intermediate 
products market” (Smarzynska, 2002).  
The transfer of technology to affiliates is not only embodied in machinery, production lines,   7
technicians and expatriates. It is also realised trough the training of local affiliate employees and the 
turnover of these among the firms. Training of local employees is one of the tools of technology 
spillovers (Almeida and Kogut, 1995). Human capital, which is determined by the quality of the 
domestic educational and training system, is a very important factor for a company. MNEs go abroad 
because of low local wages, demanding at the same time relatively skilled labour. This may be 
obtained through the training of local employees, which results in exposure to modern technology and 
management techniques. Local employees are trained by technologically superior firms such as 
MNEs, which transfer new managerial capabilities. Once trained, such employees may move to other, 
presumably technologically inferior, companies, facilitating their access to superior knowledge. Such 
“facilitation” generates productivity improvements through two mechanisms: “direct spillover to 
complementary workers (as skilled labour working alongside unskilled labour tends to improve the 
productivity of the latter) and workers that carry with them new knowledge on technology or 
management practices becoming direct agents of technology transfer” (UNECE, 2001). Evidence on 
spillovers from MNE training of local employees is still an underresearched area (Blomstrom, Kokko 
1998). Results come mainly from developing countries. Gerschenberg’s (1987) article on MNEs in 
Kenya found that foreign companies offer training of various types wider in scope than domestic 
companies. The analysis identifies movement from MNE to other companies and contribution to the 
diffusion of know-how. Katz (1987) found that managers of locally owned firms in Latin America 
often started their careers and were trained in MNE affiliates. The case for MNE local employee 
training leading to improvements in domestic companies in transition economies sheds new light on 
spillovers addressing mainly management and organizational skills in such fields as marketing, 
accounting, logistics, and training in modern leadership (Brada, 2003; Meyer, 2003). Skills of this type 
diffuse to domestic companies with the outflow of employees from MNEs and enhance the 
productivity of other groups of companies, specifically private companies.  
Spillover effects from increasing competition resulting from the entry of foreign companies may 
have positive and negative effects. The entry of foreign firms on the host country market may increase 
competition and force inefficient domestic firms to use existing technology more efficiently or to look   8
for new technology while the least efficient firms may be driven out of the market (Glass and Saggi, 
1998). The domestic companies remaining may recognize that successful competition with foreign 
affiliates requires modernisation of their own technology through increased investments, which 
eventually leads to growing productivity. The negative effects from increasing competition occur in 
industries in which the technological gap between domestic and foreign firms is large. In such cases, 
foreign companies monopolise the market over time to the detriment of domestic firms.  Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), for instance, find negative spillovers which they refer to as “market stealing effects”, 
that is, foreign investments reducing short-run domestic plant productivity by forcing domestic firms 
to cut production. Using plant level data for Morocco, Haddad and Harrison (1993) compare the 
productivity of firms with that of the best practice firm in the industry. They find no evidence of 
spillovers for the specific type of foreign presence. Competition seems, however, to push local firms 
toward the best practice frontier in industries with low technology levels. Hence, spillovers do not 
always take place in all industrial sectors. In order to examine how foreign presence impacts local 
productivity, Kokko, Tasini and Zejan (1996) divided the sample into two sub-samples defined by the 
size of the technology gaps. They found that spillovers are significant only in industries with a small 
technology gap. If the gap is small, foreign technology appears to be more useful for local firms as 
they posses the skills needed to apply or learn the foreign technology. By contrast, Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm (1999) found evidence of spillovers to domestic firms only in a subsample with a large 
technology gap. Moreover, they found that a large degree of competition increases spillovers. 
Blomstrom, Kokko and Zejan (1992) have shown that, in Mexico, local competition is positively 
correlated to the import of technology by MNEs. This impact is strong in the consumer goods 
industry, which was known to require the least advanced technologies. As regards transition 
economies, most of the studies have shown crowding-out effects from competition (Zukowska-
Gaugemann, 2000) or no evidence of spillovers on domestic companies (Konings, 2001, Damijan et 
al, 2001). 
As regards foreign share in industries, this paper uses four alternative measures of foreign 
presence: equities, sales, labour and investments. Due to the level of aggregation, however, the four 
measures cannot be applied to each of the spillover channels, but, if, for present purposes, they are   9
possible alternatives or substitutes for each other, then this illustrates the major trend with regard to 
foreign presence externalities on the productivity of domestic companies. Competition and 
demonstration effects can occur with increasing foreign presence measured in terms of equity, sales, 
investments and labour. Vertical/forward linkages are effects of increasing foreign presence in the 
form of capital (equity, investments) and market (sales) involvement. The reason for this is that the 
entry of multinational companies with foreign funds and established networks abroad guarantee a 
relatively high level of involvement with regard to equity, investments and sales. Finally, labour 
turnover is associated with foreign presence measured in terms of number of employees.  
Based on the arguments presented above and given the mixed results of spillovers found in 
different studies, the formulation of the hypothesis below is based on the results previously established 
for transition economies. 
Hypothesis 1: In a transition economy, a high share of foreign presence is associated with low 
productivity in domestic companies. 
Few perspectives describe how knowledge determines the expansion of firms and specifically 
the MNE control of its affiliate (Eden et al 1997). The public good perspective focuses on firm-
specific advantages stemming from the possession of intangible assets such as knowledge, which is 
perceived as a public good and transferred at at least negligible cost (Johnson, 1970). Thus knowledge 
is easily transferred but hard to protect, which is of critical concern to the MNE. Unintended transfer 
to and expropriation of such knowledge by competitors would dissipate the knowledge base of the 
MNE (Lorraine et al., 1997). Such cases are particularly likely to occur in transition economies, where 
property rights to knowledge have not been effective. As demonstrated by Ramacharandran (1993), 
foreign investors tend to devote more resources to the transfer of technology to their wholly-owned 
subsidiaries than to their partially-owned affiliates. Similarly, Mansfield and Romero (1980) point out 
that the transfer of technology is more rapid within wholly-owned networks of MNE subsidiaries than 
to joint ventures or licensees. The reason for this is that wholly-owned investment projects may hold 
less potential for dissipation. Consequently, the public goods perspective gives a rationale for the   10
MNE preference for wholly-owned subsidiaries as the vehicle for transferring technology and 
decreasing expropriation. 
 The internalization perspective, by contrast, concentrates on aspects which affect the transfer of 
knowledge as such (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Internalization decisions focus on the relative weights 
of bureaucratic and transaction costs. If market failure occurs in the trade of a firm’s knowledge, 
advantages are conferred on the firm which internalizes the transfer of this knowledge (Buckley and 
Casson 1976; Hennart, 1982). In a transition economy, such market failure is very likely to occur, 
increasing transaction costs. It may be related to any type of market or contractual inefficiencies such 
as a low level of protection of property rights (patents, copyrights) or any type of free riding or 
opportunistic behaviour by employees or affiliate co-owners. In such a case, the MNE transferring 
knowledge to a transition economy will, during the process of transfer, do what is best to decrease or 
avoid the transaction cost, mostly choosing highly controlled modes in case more knowledge has been 
transferred. 
The technological competence perspective rests on knowledge competence which is unique to 
each firm. This knowledge is an intangible asset which comprises the organization of work, non-
codifiable knowledge, marketing and finance know-how, and product innovations. It often resides in 
the shared norms and routines of the employees of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Exploitation of 
knowledge is firm-specific and difficult to transfer to receivers. Moreover, such attributes of 
technology as tacitness, codifiability and teachability have been shown by Kogut and Zander (1993) to 
be decisive for how technology is transferred: for example, through licensing, to a wholly-owned 
subsidiary or a joint venture. In brief, they assume a positive association between foreign control and 
technological complexity and more tacit knowledge in largely controlled affiliates. For the purpose of 
considering aspects of spillovers, the tacit character of knowledge is very important. In general, we 
would assume that as the technology of a firm is derived by relatively codifiable knowledge (and, 
consequently, has low foreign control), the ability of other firms to acquire the entire portfolio of 
knowledge a firm is limited by codifiability constraints. If the tacit component of knowledge is high 
(high foreign control), the MNE can still maintain a tight appropriability regime and deter spillovers.  
In Central and Eastern Europe, foreign companies have to engage in the training (or retraining)   11
of management, as a first step, and in the implementation of new knowledge in such fields as 
marketing, accounting, logistics, and modern leadership (Brada, 2003; Meyer, 2003). This knowledge 
is mostly of an intangible nature and absolutely critical to the organizational change of the centrally 
planned structures inherited by the privatised companies (Newman and Nollen, 2002). Consequently, 
the “hunger” for such tacit knowledge is equally observable in companies acquired either by foreign or 
domestic private investors. The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy led 
to the complete disorganisation of production and distribution (Blanchard, 1992), which was also 
reflected in an unexpected fall in domestic output levels. While foreign companies could easily 
transfer any type of organisational knowledge which already existed in their mother companies, 
domestic private investors had to either develop their own tacit knowledge or copy/imitate such 
knowledge from foreign affiliates. In this sense, domestic companies were organisationally inferior to 
foreign affiliates, which might lead to imitation of organizational knowledge. Of course, affiliates try 
to protect their knowledge from dissipation to domestic companies and, with a diminishing public 
sector, this would certainly work. The association between foreign control and the productivity of 
domestic private companies is still unrevealed in the literature, however, and the sign of the 
relationship (negative or positive) is difficult to predict. The assumption made here is based on the 
theoretical assumption made explicit in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: In a transition economy, a high level of foreign control of foreign affiliates is 
associated with a low level of performance in domestic public companies. 
Control variables 
The transition process of the Polish economy started a significant process of structural change. 
Market-oriented reforms aimed at privatisation led to organisational and technological improvements 
in the corporate sector. Over the first years of transition, the private sector in Poland, according to 
Barbonne et al. (1999), outperformed public companies with regard to productivity while productivity 
adjustments in the public sector came late and were limited in scope. The productivity improvement in 
the private sector was stronger than that attributable to cyclical recovery. The main determinant of this 
growth was the profound restructuring of recently privatised firms with domestic private owners. In   12
terms of restructuring, foreign owners are a priori the most rigorous while domestic private companies 
are fast followers (Schröder, 1997). Having the advantage in terms of wealth and expertise available, 
the relevance of foreign owners to any deep restructuring (and high levels of improvement in 
productivity) in privatised companies is important. All the arguments presented here lead to the 
expectation that domestic private companies saw productivity growth over the period analysed. 
Therefore, the analysis should be controlled by time dummies. 
Like many previous studies, this paper also assumes that spillovers will differ depending on the 
characteristics of the domestic companies (Konings, 2001; Meyer and Sinani, 2004; Zukowska-
Gagelman, 2000). For this reason, investment in new machinery and equipment, labour compensation, 
and scale in domestic companies have been included in the model of productivity. These three control 
variables will illustrate the extent to which technology investments, labour quality, and scale impact 
productivity in local firms. 
3. Empirical model  
Model 
Productivity is usually analysed with a Cobb-Douglas production function 
Y = A (K, L, M)                      (1) 
where Y is output, A is total factor productivity, K capital, L labour and M materials. Like the Felipe 
(1999) survey of the literature on total factor productivity (TFP), Meyer and Sinani (2004) assume that 
productivity varies across firms, across industries and over time. Their study describes TFP as “a 
measure of elements such as managerial capabilities and organizational competence, R&D, increasing 
returns to scale, embodied technical progress, and diffusion of technology.” As a result, total factor 
productivity is a function of such variables, depending on the focus of the study (Meyer and Sinani, 
2004). Such a TFP approach has also been adopted by Haddad and Harrison (1993) and by Zukowska-
Gagelman (2000) in the case of a transition economy. On the basis of this discussion, the production 
function has, in the present paper, been converted to the following model: 
(S/L)o, i,t = β0 + β1(FP)it + β 2(FCS)it + β 3 (S/NC) o, i,t + β 4 (I/S) o, i,t + β 5(W/L) o, i,t + TD + εi,t          (2) 
            -      -  +  +  +   13
where: S/L: productivity (sales to number of employees), FP: foreign presence, FCS: foreign capital 
share, S/NC: scale, I/S: investment intensity, W/L: labour compensation, TD: time dummies. 
Subscripts: o, i and t denote: type of ownership in the companies (private or public), industries and 
time, respectively. The signs below the coefficients indicate the assumed partial association between 
S/L and the given independent variable.    
Productivity is measured as the real sales to number of employees ratio. There are four 
alternative measures for the size of foreign presence: sales, investments, labour and foreign capital
1:  
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where: FC: foreign capital. BC: basic capital. Subscripts: foreign, private and public denote different 
types of ownership of the company. Subscripts i and t denote industries and time, respectively. 
Foreign presence (FP) measures the share of foreign sales, investments, labour and equity in total 
industry sales, investments, labour, wages and equity. Foreign capital share (FCS) is measured as the 
foreign owner’s input of capital to total capital in the foreign affiliate. Scale (S/NC) is the size of the 
firm measured by sales to number of firms. Investment Intensity (I/S) is measured as a ratio of 
investment outlays to sales. Labour compensation (W/L) is measured as wage per employee. 
Techniques of estimation 
 
Each of the ownership groups (private and public) is tested, using fixed, random effect panel 
estimations. Moreover, fixed and random effect panel estimations with instrumental variables has been 
applied. This type of estimation downsizes possible estimation biases related to endogenity between 
foreign presence and domestic productivity. The endogenity appears if foreign firms invest in more 
productive industries, leading to the reverse causality with the productivity of domestic firms. To 
account for the endogenity, two-year lagged values of four alternative measures of foreign presence 
                                                 
1 For a detailed review and description of the variables, see K. Pawlik (2004): Dataset on Foreign Affiliates in 
Poland 1993-2002. December 2004. Working paper No. 04-11. Department of Management and International 
Business, Aarhus School of Business.   14
are taken as instruments in instrumental variables fixed and random effect panel estimations. They are 
tested using Hausman test with simple fixed and random effect estimations in order find if the 
differences between both models are statistically significant. In case they are different this suggest 
about right hand variable endogenity problems in simple fixed and random effect panel estimations. 
The models with instrumented variables however eliminate endogenity but they have to be also 
tested for the relevance and validity of the instruments with a so-called Sargan test for over-identifying 
restrictions (Sargan, 1958; Bauma et al, 2002). This means that, in addition to the use of two years lag 
instruments which eliminate problems of endogenity, the Sargan test check the quality of these 
instruments.   
Data  
The data is from unique databases created in co-operation with the Central Statistical Office of 
Poland. There are three datasets with variables on different types of ownership: foreign, domestic 
private and public companies. The distinction with regard to ownership has been made at equity level. 
Foreign affiliates are those whose foreign capital share is equal to or greater than 10% of total equity. 
Domestic private companies are those in which domestic private capital is greater than public capital 
and foreign capital is lower than 10%. The same definition has been used for domestic public 
companies, which are those in which domestic public capital is greater than domestic private capital 
and foreign capital is lower than 10%. From this database, the following measures have been used: 
sales, wages, number of companies and employees, investment outlays and foreign capital share.  
4. Results 
Productivity in the years of 1993-2002 was stable with regard to the dynamics of domestic 
private firms but fluctuating in the public sector. The overall mean productivity was high in domestic 
private firms and low in public firms (see table B3 in the appendices). The correlation matrix (table 
B4) and the scatter plots (figure C1) show moderate correlation between productivities of domestic 
private and public companies. Moreover, all four foreign presence measures are highly correlated 
between themselves, implying that they should be treated as alternative measures rather than 
complementary to each other. Foreign capital share does not show any strong association with the   15
other variables. 
The estimations using fixed and random effect panel estimations versus instrumental variable 
fixed and random effect estimations showed that the differences are statistically significant, what 
suggests that some of the variables in non instrumented models are androgenic in relation to left hand 
variable. The tests between instrumental variable fixed effect panel estimation and instrumented 
variables random effect estimation favoured the first fixed effects.  
The results of the instrumented variable fixed effect panel estimation reveal that foreign capital 
and sales as measures of foreign presence show negative association with domestic private 
productivity and no impact on domestic public firms. The two measures of foreign presence as the 
employment or investment share of foreign affiliates in total industry are not significant (the sign is 
negative) in relation to the productivity of domestic private and public companies.  
Table 3. Instrumented variable fixed effect panel estimation: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
  ln (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb Ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb 
Constant  2.607  1.481 2.611 1.410 2.828 1.431 2.896 1.574 
  (7.82)**  (3.99)** (8.66)** (3.94)** (10.34)** (3.96)**  (10.44)** (3.42)** 
ln (FC)t  -0.244  -0.036        
  (2.77)**  (0.20)        
ln (S)t     -0.247 -0.178        
     (2.08)*  (0.76)      
ln (L)t       -0.053  -0.082    
       (0.72)  (0.57)    
ln (I)t         -0.048  -0.055 
         (0.31)  (0.19) 
ln (FCS)t  -0.178  -0.043 -0.106 -0.053 -0.024 -0.013 -0.017 -0.011 
  (1.69)  (0.20) (1.26) (0.34) (0.34) (0.09) (0.23) (0.09) 
ln (I/S)o,t-1  0.017 -0.038 0.018  -0.031 0.008  -0.039 0.009  -0.035 
  (0.76)  (1.35) (0.89) (1.06) (0.42) (1.36) (0.46) (1.01) 
ln (S/NC)o,t-1  0.081  0.106  0.054  0.092  0.065  0.099  0.065  0.107 
  (2.10)*  (2.91)**  (1.99)*  (2.25)*  (1.98)*  (2.57)*  (1.69)  (2.91)** 
ln (W/L)o,t-1  0.068  0.330  0.185  0.343  0.139  0.337  0.133  0.337 
 (0.69)  (2.77)**  (2.20)*  (2.98)**  (1.76)  (2.93)**  (1.65)  (2.89)** 
σ 96  0.051  0.246 0.054 0.251 0.033 0.247 0.032 0.236 
  (1.31)  (3.98)** (1.55)  (4.20)** (1.03)  (4.15)** (0.93)  (3.55)** 
σ 97  0.098  0.152 0.092 0.173 0.051 0.154 0.052 0.130 
  (2.25)*  (2.00)* (2.25)* (2.38)* (1.49)  (2.40)* (1.12)  (1.45) 
σ 98  0.110  0.256 0.110 0.284 0.057 0.266 0.047 0.236 
  (2.19)* (2.82)** (2.17)*  (3.28)** (1.28)  (3.39)** (0.99)  (2.87)** 
σ 99  0.201  0.246 0.183 0.286 0.124 0.262 0.115 0.219 
  (3.50)**  (2.27)*  (3.32)** (2.68)** (2.50)*  (2.76)** (1.92)  (2.08)* 
σ 00  0.220  0.259 0.330 0.398 0.129 0.277 0.027 0.328 
  (3.35)**  (1.94) (2.81)**  (1.73) (2.30)*  (2.38)*  (0.11) (0.71) 
σ 01  0.179  0.254 0.195 0.307 0.126 0.278 0.114 0.227 
  (3.11)**  (2.12)* (3.09)**  (2.30)* (2.22)* (2.31)* (1.71)  (1.78) 
σ 02  0.231  0.259 0.251 0.329 0.153 0.285 0.135 0.228   16
  (3.54)**  (1.79)  (3.25)**  (2.06)* (2.40)* (2.13)* (1.98)* (1.82) 
N  375  350 375 350 375 350 375 350 
Number  of  industries  70  64 70 64 70 64 70 64 
Sargan test:  
Overidentifing 
restriction   1.04  6.63 1.03 0.00 2.37 0.01 1.16 0.02 
P-value  0.36  0.01 0.37 0.96 0.12 0.92 0.28 0.90 
Notes: The dependent variables are ln(S/L)pr and ln(S/L)pb, where pr denotes domestic private and pb domestic public companies. The 
independent variables (all in natural logs) are:  
  (1) four measures of spillovers (share of foreign affiliates in total industry): FC: foreign capital, S: sales, I: investments, L: 
employees; All this four measures are instrumented with 1-year and 2-year lagged variables. 
 (2)  FCS: foreign control,  
  (3) I/S: investment intensity, S/NC: scale economies, W/L: real wage per worker  
 (4)  σ 96,  σ 97, etc., indicate time dummies 
  *, ** significant at 5, 1% levels, respectively.  
Therefore, hypothesis 1 is almost fully confirmed.  Any Foreign Capital Share impact on 
domestic productivity has not been confirmed; the association is negative, however, indicating no tacit 
knowledge inflow to domestic firms. Therefore, hypothesis 2 should not be fully rejected. Control 
variables taken with the lags illustrate the common expectation that large companies with high labour 
compensation per employee tend to have high productivity. The assumption of causality between 
investment intensity and productivity has not been confirmed. Time dummies show a strong tendency 
toward productivity growth across all the years for domestic private companies. The stable growth in 
the productivity of the public sector is confirmed only for 1999 and the following years. The Sargan 
test for over-identifying restrictions shows a reasonably high level of instruments quality/validity - 
roughly 0.40. 
The estimations have also been divided into two sub-periods (1993-1997 and 1998-2002). The 
results for equity and sales as a measure of foreign presence confirm previous results, showing 
negative association with the productivity of domestic private companies in both periods. Similar 
results in this estimation were received for control variables. 
5. Conclusions  
The aim of this paper is to study the significance of Foreign Direct Investments and their 
spillovers in a transition country such as Poland. Negative results for association between foreign 
presence and the productivity of domestic private firms confirm previous studies on spillover effects in 
transition economies, illustrating a long-term competition effect leading to the crowding out of 
domestic private companies from manufacturing industries. In industries in which foreign presence is 
growing with regard to equity and sales, labour productivity in domestic private firms is decreasing.   17
One explanation for this phenomenon is related to the process of privatisation. Foreign investors were 
acquiring the best companies launched for privatisation while the worst group of firms remained in the 
public sector. The private firms, however, were placed somewhere between foreign and public firms. 
Without significant funds they could not participate in the privatisation processes – at least in the first 
years of transition – and companies could not restructure to such an extent and dynamism as their 
foreign competitors, which possessed significant funds and technology.  
However statistically insignificant, foreign control of foreign affiliates has a negative sign in 
relation to the productivity of domestic companies. This negative association with local productivity 
suggests that there are no outflows of tacit knowledge from foreign affiliates to local companies. 
Control variables as one year lagged labour compensation and scale in domestic private and 
public companies have positive association with their levels of productivity, suggesting that, if the 
productivity increases in local companies, this is an effect of scale and improvements in labour 
quality. 
The main limitation of this analysis is that the cross-industry level of analysis brings only 
aggregated and general results for the Polish economy, while ignoring some positive technology 
spillover effects at the level of specific industries and inter-firm (foreign/domestic) linkages which 
may only be observable on the basis of firm-level data.  
   18
References 
Aitken, B. and Harrison, A. (1999), Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? 
Evidence from Venezuela, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, 605-618. 
Almeida, P. and B. Kogut, 1995, ‘The Geographic Localization of Ideas and the Mobility of Patent 
Holders, CIBER, University of Maryland, Oct. 20. 
Bauma, Ch. F., Schaffer, M.E. (2002), Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing, 
Boston College Economics Working Paper 545. 
Blomstrom, M. and A. Kokko. 1998. How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries. The World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1745 
Blomstrom, M. and Persson, H. (1983), Foreign Investment and Spillover Efficiency in and 
Underdeveloped Economy: Evidence from the Mexican Manufacturing Industry. World Development, 
Vol. 11, 493-501. 
Bosco, M. G. (2001), Does FDI Contribute to Technological Spillovers and Growth? A Panel Data 
Analysis of Hungarian Firms. Transnational Corporations, Vol. 10(No. 1):pp. 43-68.  
Brada, J. C. (2003), Chapter 5: Privatisation, restructuring, corporate governance and the behaviour of 
firms in transition economies / ed. by Heinz-Jürgen Stüting et al.Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Buckley, P.J., Casson, M., (1976), The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, London: Macmillan 
Cantwell, J., 1989, Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Caves, R.E. (1974), Multinational Firms, Competition and Productivity in Host Country Markets. 
Economica, Vol. 41, 176-193. 
Caves, R.E. 1974. Multinational Firms, Competition and Productivity in Host Country Markets. 
Economica, Vol. 41, 176-193. 
Damijan, J, Majcen B., Knell M., and Rojec M. (2001), The role of FDI, Absorptive Capacity and 
Trade in Transferring Technology to Transition countries: Evidence from Firm Panel Data for Eight 
Transition Countries, Sept. Mimeo.  
Djankov, S. and Hoekman B. (2000), Foreign Investment and Productivity Growth in Czech 
Enterprises, World Bank Economic Review. 
Dunning, J.H. (1993), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, Wokingham, UK:Addison-
Wesley. 
Eden, L., Levitas E., Martinez R.J., (1997), The production, transfer and spillover of technology: 
comparing large and small multinationals as technology producers, Small Business Economics, 9, 53-
66. 
Felipe, Jesus. 1999. Total Factor Productivity Growth in East Asia: A critical survey. The Journal of 
Development Studies. Vol. 35(4), 1-41. 
Görg, H. and D. Greenaway (2004). Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit 
from Foreign Direct Investment?. The World Bank Research Observer 19(2): 171-197. 
Globerman, S. 1979. Foreign Direct Investment and “Spillover” Efficiency Benefits in Canadian 
Manufacturing Industries. Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol. 12, 42-56. 
Haddad, M. and A. Harrison. 1993. Are There Positive Spillovers from Direct Foreign Investment? 
Evidence from Panel Data for Morocco. Journal of Development Economics, Vol.42, 51-74. 
Hennart, J.-F. (1982), A theory of multinational enterprise, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Katz, J.M. 1987. Technology creation in Latin American manufacturing industries, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press.    19
Kogut, B. and  Zander, U. (1993), Knowledge of the Firm and the Evolutionary theory of 
Multinational Corporation. Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 24, 625-646. 
Kogut, B. Zander U., (1993) Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the multinational 
corporation, Journal of International Business Studies, 24, 625- 645 
Kokko, A. (1994), Technology, Market Characteristics, and Spillovers, Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 43, 279-293. 
Kokko, A., Tasini, R. and M. Zejan. 1996. Local Technological Capability and Productivity Spillovers 
from FDI in the Uruguayan Manufacturing Sector. Journal of Development Studies, Vol.32, 602-611. 
Konings, J. (2001), The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Domestic Firms: Evidence from 
Firm- Level Panel Data in Emerging Economies. Economics of Transition, Vol. 9(3). 619-633. 
Meyer, K., (2001), Institutions, transaction costs and entry mode choice in Eastern Europe, Journal of 
International Business Studies, Vol. 31, Iss. 2, pp 257-367. 
Nelson and Winter (1982): An Evolutionary Theory if Economic Change, Boston: Harvard University 
Press. 
PAIZ (2003), The list of the largest foreign Investors in Poland, PAIZ, Warsaw. 
Pawlik, K. (2005), Increasing role of foreign capital in Poland since 1993, Working Paper, 05-04. 
Department of International Business. Aarhus School of Business. Denmark. 
Rhee, Y.W. and T. Belot (1990): Export catalysts in low-income countries, Washington, CD: The 
World Bank, 1990.  
Rodrik, D. (1999): The new global economy and developing countries: making openness work, Policy 
Essay nr. 24, Overseas Development Council, John Hopkins University Press, Washington, DC. 
Sargan, J. (1958), The estimation of economic relationship using instrumental variables, Econometrica 
26 (3), 393-415. 
Schröder, P.J.H. (1997), On privatisation and restructuring, Working paper, University  of Southern 
Denmark  
Sjöholm, F. (1997), Technology Gap, Competition and spillovers from Direct Foreign Investments: 
Evidence from establishment data, Working Paper No.38, December 1997  
Sjöholm, F. 1999. Tecgnology Gap, Competition and Spillovers from Direct Foreign Investment: 
Evidence from Establishment Data. Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 36, 53-73. 
Yudaeva, K., Kozlov, K., Melentieva, N. and Ponomareva, N. (2000), Does Foreign Ownership 
Matter? Russian Experience. CEFIR Working Paper No.1. 
Zukowska-Gagelmann, K. (2000), Productivity Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in Poland. 
Economic Systems, Vol. 24, No. 3, 223-256. 
   20
Appendix A – Data Confidentiality 
 
 
Although the dataset consists of industry level data, it is important to present the number of the entities 
captured across different ownership groupings and time. The number of companies captured in the 
analysis varies from 3,000 to 10,000 in the case of Polish manufacturing (Figure A1). 
Figure A1. Number of companies established under Polish commercial law across different 
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Foreign Affiliates Domestic private companies Domestic public companies
 
Source: own adaptation 
 
On average, the coverage of the data is around 85-90%; the industries excluded are those in which at 
least in one out of the three ownership groups (foreign, private or public) datasets GUS has hidden the 
data in accordance with confidentiality regulations. If, for instance, one of the industries in the public 
companies dataset consists of less than three public firms, GUS will treat this industry as confidential. 
As a result, it has not been possible to use the data for domestic private and foreign companies in such 
an industry as the analysis would not have complete information on the entire industry and, 
consequently, foreign presence could not be calculated properly. This situation is the case for 10-15% 
of all the observations and, from the perspective of the size of sales and investments, it only holds of 
industries which are small. The real impact (bias) on the result is marginal. Appendix B 
 
Table B1. Available and confidential observations: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
 
Available in entire dataset 
 
 
(number of companies) 
Available after exclusion of confidential data 
 
 
(number of companies) 
Available observations after exclusion of 
confidential data, as a percentage of total 
 
(percent) 
Type  of  companies  Foreign Private  Public  Foreign Private  Public Foreign Private  Public 
1993 1548  1902 409 969 1417 362 0.63 0.75 0.89 
1994 1826  3670 552 1331 2984 524 0.73 0.81 0.95 
1995 2243  4435 872 1994 4013 824 0.89 0.90 0.94 
1996 2287  5153 950 1823 4351 911 0.80 0.84 0.96 
1997 2360  6635 658 2060 5688 608 0.87 0.86 0.92 
1998 2533  6979 670 2268 5965 623 0.90 0.85 0.93 
1999 2751  7027 732 2530 6408 687 0.92 0.91 0.94 
2000 2813  7092 714 2361 5916 650 0.84 0.83 0.91 
2001 2805  7476 645 2322 6450 638 0.83 0.86 0.99 
2002 2688  7118 544 2124 5694 515 0.79 0.80 0.95 
Source: Own calculations based on GUS. 
  
Table B2. Panel data summary - Polish Manufacturing: 1993-2002 
 
Variables   Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
overall 52.21 50.09 0.00  679.91 
between   63.70     (S/L) private 
within   19.85    
overall 37.10 61.24 0.00  890.18 
between   92.96     (S/L) public 
within   19.06    
overall 0.32 0.23 0.00  0.93 
between   0.20     FC 
within   0.12    
overall 0.41 0.26 0.00  1.00 
between   0.22     S 
within   0.15    
overall 0.28 0.20 0.00  0.90 
between   0.18     L 
within   0.09    
overall 0.45 0.29 0.00  1.00 
between   0.24     I 
within   0.19    
overall 0.78 0.21 0.00  1.00 
between   0.20     FCS 
within   0.13    
Source: Own calculation  
 
 
Table B4. Correlation matrix – Polish Manufacturing: 1993-2002 
 
S/L  Foreign Presence (FP)  S/NC  I/S  W/L  VARIABLES 
Private Public  FC S  L  I 
FCS 
Private Public Private Public Private Public
(S/L) private   1.00         
(S/L) public    0.84 1.00        
FC  0.05 0.03 1.00       
S  0.12 0.10 0.76 1.00      
L  0.06 0.08 0.60 0.50 1.00      
FP 
I  0.21 0.18 0.73 0.85 0.67 1.00      
FCS  -0.06 -0.11 0.46 0.26 0.17 0.15 1.00      
(S/NC) private   0.64 0.40 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 1.00      
(S/NC) public    0.61 0.73 -0.16 -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.19 0.42 1.00      
(I/S) private   -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.08 1.00     
(I/S) public    -0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.14  1.00   
(W/L) private   0.37 0.33 0.11 0.18 -0.03 0.18 0.08 0.26 0.26 0.06 -0.02  1.00 
(W/L) public    0.32 0.40 0.15 0.23 0.04 0.24 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.01 -0.03  0.71  1.00
Source: Own calculation. Appendix C 
 
 

















Source: Own calculation. 
  




Table D1. Instrumented variable fixed effect panel estimation: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
 
  ln (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb Ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb 
Constant  2.607  1.481 2.611 1.410 2.828 1.431 2.896 1.574 
  (7.82)**  (3.99)** (8.66)** (3.94)** (10.34)** (3.96)**  (10.44)** (3.42)** 
ln (FC)t  -0.244  -0.036        
  (2.77)**  (0.20)        
ln (S)t     -0.247 -0.178        
     (2.08)*  (0.76)      
ln (L)t       -0.053  -0.082    
       (0.72)  (0.57)    
ln (I)t         -0.048  -0.055 
         (0.31)  (0.19) 
ln (FCS)t  -0.178  -0.043 -0.106 -0.053 -0.024 -0.013 -0.017 -0.011 
  (1.69)  (0.20) (1.26) (0.34) (0.34) (0.09) (0.23) (0.09) 
ln (I/S)o,t-1  0.017 -0.038 0.018  -0.031 0.008  -0.039 0.009  -0.035 
  (0.76)  (1.35) (0.89) (1.06) (0.42) (1.36) (0.46) (1.01) 
ln (S/NC)o,t-1  0.081  0.106  0.054  0.092  0.065  0.099  0.065  0.107 
  (2.10)*  (2.91)**  (1.99)*  (2.25)*  (1.98)*  (2.57)*  (1.69)  (2.91)** 
ln (W/L)o,t-1  0.068  0.330  0.185  0.343  0.139  0.337  0.133  0.337 
 (0.69)  (2.77)**  (2.20)*  (2.98)**  (1.76)  (2.93)**  (1.65)  (2.89)** 
σ 96  0.051  0.246 0.054 0.251 0.033 0.247 0.032 0.236 
  (1.31)  (3.98)** (1.55)  (4.20)** (1.03)  (4.15)** (0.93)  (3.55)** 
σ 97  0.098  0.152 0.092 0.173 0.051 0.154 0.052 0.130 
  (2.25)*  (2.00)* (2.25)* (2.38)* (1.49)  (2.40)* (1.12)  (1.45) 
σ 98  0.110  0.256 0.110 0.284 0.057 0.266 0.047 0.236 
  (2.19)* (2.82)** (2.17)*  (3.28)** (1.28)  (3.39)** (0.99)  (2.87)** 
σ 99  0.201  0.246 0.183 0.286 0.124 0.262 0.115 0.219 
  (3.50)**  (2.27)*  (3.32)** (2.68)** (2.50)*  (2.76)** (1.92)  (2.08)* 
σ 00  0.220  0.259 0.330 0.398 0.129 0.277 0.027 0.328 
  (3.35)**  (1.94) (2.81)**  (1.73) (2.30)*  (2.38)*  (0.11) (0.71) 
σ 01  0.179  0.254 0.195 0.307 0.126 0.278 0.114 0.227 
  (3.11)**  (2.12)* (3.09)**  (2.30)* (2.22)* (2.31)* (1.71)  (1.78) 
σ 02  0.231  0.259 0.251 0.329 0.153 0.285 0.135 0.228 
  (3.54)**  (1.79)  (3.25)**  (2.06)* (2.40)* (2.13)* (1.98)* (1.82) 
N  375  350 375 350 375 350 375 350 
Number  of  industries  70  64 70 64 70 64 70 64 
Sargan test:  
Overidentifing 
restriction   1.04  6.63 1.03 0.00 2.37 0.01 1.16 0.02 
P-value  0.36  0.01 0.37 0.96 0.12 0.92 0.28 0.90 
Hausman test for determining whether the difference between fixed effect panel and instrumental variable panel estimation  
is statistically significant: 
Hausman test  50.35**  897.54**  32.12**  2357.57**  13.19  -8593.69  22.96*  -532.34 
Notes: The dependent variables are ln(S/L)pr and ln(S/L)pb, where pr denotes domestic private and pb domestic public companies. The 
independent variables (all in natural logs) are:  
  (1) four measures of spillovers (share of foreign affiliates in total industry): FC: foreign capital, S: sales, I: investments, L: 
employees; All this four measures are instrumented with 1-year and 2-year lagged variables. 
 (2)  FCS: foreign control,  
  (3) I/S: investment intensity, S/NC: scale economies, W/L: real wage per worker  
 (4)  σ 96,  σ 97, etc., indicate time dummies 
  *, ** significant at 5, 1% levels, respectively.    25
Table D2. Instrumented variable random effect panel estimation: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
 
  ln (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb Ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb 
Constant  1.427  0.724 1.743 0.777 1.881 0.820 1.843 0.763 
  (5.29)**  (2.23)* (6.64)**  (2.39)* (7.21)**  (2.50)* (6.59)**  (2.30)* 
ln (FC)t  -0.091  0.029        
  (1.64)  (0.37)        
ln (S)t     -0.059  0.057      
     (0.86)  (0.72)      
ln (L)t       0.041  0.081    
       (0.80)  (1.23)    
ln (I)t         -0.136  0.080 
         (0.86)  (0.57) 
ln (FCS)t  0.096 -0.071 -0.007 -0.024 0.025  -0.019 -0.001 -0.051 
  (1.07)  (0.47) (0.09) (0.18) (0.35) (0.14) (0.01) (0.38) 
ln (I/S)o,t-1  0.001 -0.052 0.001  -0.053 -0.003 -0.051 0.006  -0.048 
  (0.05)  (1.76) (0.03) (1.80) (0.15) (1.76) (0.26) (1.61) 
ln (S/NC)o,t-1  0.215  0.177 0.180 0.178 0.184 0.181 0.169 0.180 
  (6.92)**  (5.16)** (5.97)** (5.08)** (6.11)** (5.26)** (4.62)** (5.05)** 
ln (W/L)o,t-1  0.239  0.419 0.246 0.403 0.231 0.402 0.224 0.405 
  (2.87)**  (3.76)** (3.10)** (3.59)** (2.94)** (3.61)** (2.58)** (3.56)** 
σ 95  0.039  0.263 0.037 0.263 0.027 0.260 0.040 0.260 
  (1.06)  (4.17)** (1.05)  (4.20)** (0.78)  (4.15)** (1.02)  (4.07)** 
σ 96  0.055  0.128 0.047 0.127 0.029 0.126 0.064 0.120 
  (1.40)  (1.93) (1.28) (1.95) (0.82) (1.94) (1.28) (1.72) 
σ 97  0.015  0.249 0.015 0.246 -0.015 0.239 0.023 0.251 
  (0.34)  (3.35)** (0.36)  (3.39)** (0.35)  (3.28)** (0.46)  (3.45)** 
σ 98  0.062  0.211 0.061 0.208 0.026 0.197 0.079 0.210 
  (1.33) (2.52)* (1.36)  (2.52)* (0.57)  (2.38)* (1.31)  (2.54)* 
σ 99  0.049  0.215 0.082 0.182 0.009 0.199 -0.189  0.365 
  (0.94)  (2.12)*  (1.07) (1.58) (0.19) (1.99)*  (0.73) (1.39) 
σ 00  0.029  0.220 0.044 0.213 0.002 0.199 0.063 0.219 
  (0.60)  (2.16)*  (0.88) (2.07)*  (0.04) (1.93) (0.95) (2.14)* 
σ 01  0.079  0.240 0.088 0.229 0.032 0.214 0.100 0.248 
  (1.50)  (2.17)*  (1.53) (2.07)*  (0.58) (1.94) (1.44) (2.31)* 
σ 02  1.427  0.724 1.743 0.777 1.881 0.820 1.843 0.763 
  (5.29)**  (2.23)* (6.64)**  (2.39)* (7.21)**  (2.50)* (6.59)**  (2.30)* 
N  375  350 375 350 375 350 375 350 
Number  of  industries  70  64 70 64 70 64 70 64 
Hausman  test  58.96** 186.61** 75.32**  191.28** 126.48** 121.02** -39.38  99.63** 
Hausman test for determining whether the difference between fixed effect panel and instrumental variable panel estimation  
is statistically significant: 
Hausman  test  -3.47 -14.18 6.52** -15.54 7.27**  -31.09 -22.96 -14.14 
Notes: The dependent variables are ln(S/L)pr and ln(S/L)pb, where pr denotes domestic private and pb domestic public companies. 
The independent variables (all in natural logs) are:  
  (1) four measures of spillovers (share of foreign affiliates in total industry): FC: foreign capital, S: sales, I: investments, L: 
employees;  
 (2)  FCS: foreign control,  
  (3) I/S: investment intensity, S/NC: scale economies, W/L: real wage per worker  
 (4)  σ 94,  σ 95, etc., indicate time dummies 
  *, ** significant at 5, 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table D3. Pooled OLS regression for Productivity: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
 
  ln (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb Ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb 
Constant  -0.723 -1.235 -0.734 -1.190 -0.626 -1.088 -0.750 -1.216 
  (2.40)* (3.41)**  (2.42)* (3.22)**  (2.15)* (3.12)**  (2.44)* (3.32)** 
ln (FC)t  0.024  0.085        
  (1.16)  (3.46)**        
ln (S)t    0.028  0.068      
    (1.11)  (2.25)*      
ln (L)t      0.077  0.127    
      (3.06)**  (4.30)**    
ln (I)t        0.019  0.076 
        (0.87)  (3.01)** 
ln (FCS)t  -0.145 -0.266 -0.114 -0.157 -0.097 -0.125 -0.120 -0.189 
  (1.46) (2.17)*  (1.19) (1.28) (1.02) (1.03) (1.26) (1.57) 
ln (I/S)o,t-1  -0.072 -0.139 -0.070 -0.135 -0.073 -0.140 -0.069 -0.131 
  (1.97)*  (3.82)** (1.96)  (3.71)** (2.08)*  (3.94)** (1.94)  (3.69)** 
ln (S/NC)o,t-1  0.366 0.305 0.371 0.302 0.368 0.309 0.369 0.302 
  (12.46)** (9.83)**  (12.21)** (9.35)**  (12.59)** (10.25)** (12.24)** (9.69)** 
ln (W/L)o,t-1  0.666 0.843 0.659 0.833 0.660 0.803 0.662 0.833 
  (9.04)** (7.58)** (8.94)** (7.48)** (8.96)** (7.32)** (8.98)** (7.60)** 
σ 95  0.009 -0.136  0.011 -0.119  0.008 -0.130  0.015 -0.108 
  (0.09) (1.28) (0.12) (1.11) (0.08) (1.24) (0.16) (1.01) 
σ 96  0.132 0.138 0.132 0.147 0.126 0.143 0.135 0.149 
  (1.46) (1.34) (1.46) (1.41) (1.40) (1.40) (1.48) (1.43) 
σ 97  0.129 -0.072  0.128 -0.062  0.119 -0.064  0.132 -0.057 
  (1.46) (0.67) (1.43) (0.57) (1.36) (0.60) (1.48) (0.53) 
σ 98  0.006  -0.012 0.003  -0.002 -0.015 -0.015 0.011  0.016 
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
σ 99  -0.065 -0.088 -0.068 -0.079 -0.086 -0.089 -0.059 -0.057 
  (0.74) (0.80) (0.77) (0.70) (1.00) (0.82) (0.68) (0.51) 
σ 00  -0.099 -0.175 -0.118 -0.201 -0.125 -0.175 -0.056 0.003 
  (1.09) (1.40) (1.24) (1.57) (1.39) (1.42) (0.59) (0.02) 
σ 01  -0.098 -0.117 -0.105 -0.116 -0.131 -0.131 -0.096 -0.094 
  (1.07) (0.92) (1.14) (0.90) (1.43) (1.04) (1.05) (0.73) 
σ 02  -0.040 -0.024 -0.047 -0.015 -0.077 -0.033 -0.034 0.016 
  (0.43) (0.18) (0.50) (0.11) (0.82) (0.24) (0.37) (0.12) 
N  475 435 475 435 475 435 475 435 
Number  of  industries  0.52 0.46 0.52 0.45 0.53 0.47 0.52 0.45 
F-test  34.95** 19.22** 34.64** 18.46** 34.63** 19.33** 34.51** 18.95** 
VIF  1.93 2.16 1.94 2.16 1.92 2.14 1.97 2.23 
Notes: The dependent variables are ln(S/L)pr and ln(S/L)pb, where pr denotes domestic private and pb domestic public companies. 
The independent variables (all in natural logs) are:  
  (1) four measures of spillovers (share of foreign affiliates in total industry): FC: foreign capital, S: sales, I: investments, L: 
employees;  
 (2)  FCS: foreign control,  
  (3) I/S: investment intensity, S/NC: scale economies, W/L: real wage per worker  
 (4)  σ 95,  σ 96, etc., indicate time dummies 
  *, ** significant at 5, 1% levels, respectively.    27
Table D4. Fixed effect panel estimation for Productivity: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
 
  ln (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb Ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb 
Constant  2.754  1.718 2.723 1.688 2.769 1.672 2.779 1.743 
 (11.76)**  (6.13)**  (11.57)**  (6.06)**  (11.69)** (5.92)**  (11.85)** (6.19)** 
ln (FC)t  -0.029  -0.053        
  (1.68)  (1.71)        
ln (S)t     -0.049  -0.121      
     (1.92)  (2.77)**      
ln (L)t       -0.008  -0.088    
       (0.30)  (1.79)    
ln (I)t         -0.001  -0.002 
         (0.10)  (0.10) 
ln (FCS)t  0.051  0.101 0.021 0.046 0.024 0.043 0.024 0.048 
  (0.94)  (1.00) (0.40) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46) (0.50) 
ln (I/S)o,t-1  0.026 -0.025 0.028  -0.020 0.027  -0.024 0.027  -0.024 
  (1.66)  (1.04) (1.75) (0.85) (1.71) (0.98) (1.71) (0.99) 
ln (S/NC)o,t-1  0.080  0.127 0.080 0.119 0.082 0.122 0.083 0.133 
  (3.02)**  (4.39)** (3.02)** (4.11)** (3.08)** (4.17)** (3.10)** (4.59)** 
ln (W/L)o,t-1  0.167  0.186 0.171 0.200 0.169 0.197 0.171 0.191 
  (2.63)**  (2.01)* (2.70)**  (2.17)* (2.65)**  (2.12)* (2.68)**  (2.05)* 
σ 95  0.015 -0.166 0.014  -0.162 0.006  -0.173 0.005  -0.183 
  (0.42)  (2.96)** (0.41)  (2.93)** (0.17)  (3.10)** (0.14)  (3.29)** 
σ 96  0.093  0.107 0.094 0.112 0.083 0.102 0.082 0.091 
  (2.68)**  (1.87) (2.70)**  (1.98)*  (2.41)*  (1.78) (2.38)*  (1.60) 
σ 97  0.094  0.005 0.098 0.021 0.082 0.000 0.080 -0.018 
  (2.58)*  (0.08) (2.68)**  (0.34) (2.26)*  (0.01) (2.22)*  (0.30) 
σ 98  0.101  0.113 0.105 0.129 0.086 0.113 0.082 0.087 
  (2.57)*  (1.67) (2.66)**  (1.93) (2.17)*  (1.68) (2.16)*  (1.31) 
σ 99  0.140  0.136 0.147 0.158 0.125 0.141 0.120 0.107 
  (3.41)**  (1.83) (3.52)**  (2.13)*  (2.95)**  (1.88) (3.02)**  (1.48) 
σ 00  0.153  0.174 0.188 0.263 0.138 0.183 0.135 0.139 
  (3.47)**  (1.94)  (3.67)** (2.69)** (2.99)** (2.02)*  (2.77)** (1.40) 
σ 01  0.162  0.186 0.175 0.219 0.151 0.205 0.145 0.162 
  (3.69)**  (2.05)* (3.85)**  (2.39)* (3.22)**  (2.21)* (3.35)**  (1.80) 
σ 02  0.172  0.203 0.187 0.239 0.158 0.220 0.151 0.170 
  (3.77)**  (2.10)* (3.93)**  (2.45)* (3.22)**  (2.22)* (3.41)**  (1.78) 
N  475  435 475 435 475 435 475 435 
Number  of  industries  85  73 85 73 85 73 85 73 
R-squared  0.31  0.28 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.28 
F-value  31.60**  16.89** 31.69** 17.49** 30.65** 16.56** 31.38** 16.88** 
Notes: The dependent variables are ln(S/L)pr and ln(S/L)pb, where pr denotes domestic private and pb domestic public companies. 
The independent variables (all in natural logs) are:  
  (1) four measures of spillovers (share of foreign affiliates in total industry): FC: foreign capital, S: sales, I: investments, L: 
employees;  
 (2)  FCS: foreign control,  
  (3) I/S: investment intensity, S/NC: scale economies, W/L: real wage per worker  
 (4)  σ 95,  σ 96, etc., indicate time dummies 
  *, ** significant at 5, 1% levels, respectively.    28
Table D5. Random effect panel estimation for Productivity: Polish Manufacturing 1993-2002. 
 
  ln (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb Ln  (S/L)pr ln  (S/L)pb 
Constant  1.940  0.809 1.928 0.804 1.971 0.785 1.964 0.814 
  (8.64)**  (2.99)** (8.55)** (2.97)** (8.71)** (2.87)** (8.77)** (3.00)** 
ln (FC)t  -0.022  -0.033        
  (1.26)  (1.16)        
ln (S)t     -0.030  -0.066      
     (1.22)  (1.72)      
ln (L)t       0.028  0.007    
       (1.06)  (0.17)    
ln (I)t         0.008  0.012 
         (0.50)  (0.49) 
ln (FCS)t  0.009 -0.106 -0.014 -0.141 -0.012 -0.151 -0.016 -0.154 
  (0.16)  (1.08) (0.27) (1.54) (0.23) (1.63) (0.29) (1.66) 
ln (I/S)o,t-1  0.015 -0.035 0.016  -0.032 0.015  -0.035 0.015  -0.034 
  (0.89)  (1.41) (0.94) (1.29) (0.88) (1.42) (0.93) (1.38) 
ln (S/NC)o,t-1  0.167  0.199 0.166 0.194 0.171 0.207 0.168 0.205 
  (6.66)**  (7.27)** (6.63)** (7.05)** (6.82)** (7.48)** (6.71)** (7.52)** 
ln (W/L)o,t-1  0.253  0.257 0.256 0.266 0.261 0.262 0.256 0.258 
  (3.92)**  (2.71)** (3.96)** (2.81)** (4.02)** (2.74)** (3.95)** (2.71)** 
σ 95  0.087  0.232 0.086 0.232 0.080 0.229 0.082 0.227 
  (2.92)**  (4.68)** (2.91)** (4.70)** (2.69)** (4.58)** (2.76)** (4.55)** 
σ 96  0.084  0.104 0.086 0.110 0.073 0.096 0.077 0.094 
  (2.69)**  (1.95) (2.71)**  (2.06)*  (2.31)*  (1.78) (2.44)*  (1.76) 
σ 97  0.066  0.238 0.068 0.244 0.047 0.228 0.056 0.228 
  (1.94)  (4.05)** (1.97)*  (4.15)** (1.35)  (3.83)** (1.67)  (3.90)** 
σ 98  0.088  0.251 0.090 0.259 0.065 0.239 0.077 0.240 
  (2.48)* (3.82)** (2.51)*  (3.94)** (1.76)  (3.59)** (2.19)*  (3.67)** 
σ 99  0.090  0.282 0.110 0.326 0.064 0.268 0.093 0.293 
  (2.34)* (3.42)** (2.45)*  (3.72)** (1.57)  (3.19)** (2.05)*  (3.13)** 
σ 00  0.098  0.308 0.106 0.322 0.074 0.299 0.090 0.300 
  (2.57)* (3.70)** (2.67)** (3.85)** (1.80)  (3.51)** (2.34)*  (3.60)** 
σ 01  0.122  0.359 0.130 0.372 0.093 0.345 0.111 0.348 
  (3.05)**  (4.07)** (3.11)** (4.20)** (2.15)*  (3.83)** (2.80)** (3.96)** 
σ 02  1.940  0.809 1.928 0.804 1.971 0.785 1.964 0.814 
  (8.64)**  (2.99)** (8.55)** (2.97)** (8.71)** (2.87)** (8.77)** (3.00)** 
N  475  435 475 435 475 435 475 435 
Number  of  industries  85  73 85 73 85 73 85 73 
Hausman  test  124.52**  -50.43  77.24** 3.58**  78.00** -4.30  59.01** 2780.68**
Notes: The dependent variables are ln(S/L)pr and ln(S/L)pb, where pr denotes domestic private and pb domestic public companies. 
The independent variables (all in natural logs) are:  
  (1) four measures of spillovers (share of foreign affiliates in total industry): FC: foreign capital, S: sales, I: investments, L: 
employees;  
 (2)  FCS: foreign control,  
  (3) I/S: investment intensity, S/NC: scale economies, W/L: real wage per worker  
 (4)  σ 95,  σ 96, etc., indicate time dummies 
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